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COMMENTS
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF PLEDGE UNDER LOUISIANA CIVIL
CODE ARTICLE 3158 AND RELATED ARTICLES'
According to the scholar Denis, "[t]he pledge springs from natural
law and is of the farthest antiquity;" it secured debts "in the primitive
relations of men." ' 2 Although the specific beginnings are unknown, fre-
quent mention of the pledge in ancient texts evidences its early application3
and points to at least one conclusion: that in its earliest stages of
development, formalities of pledge were much simpler, albeit more dra-
matic, than those of today.
Herodotus, in his Histories, explains that a debtor in ancient Egypt
would deliver the mummy of his father to his creditor, who was quite
willing to make a loan on this basis.4 Since the mummy was of great
religious value to the debtor, he would certainly pay the debt in order
to redeem the pledge.
In ancient Athens and Rome, the mechanics of pledge were similarly
simple: the debtor and creditor contracted that, upon default of the
loan, the debtor would become the slave of the creditor until the debt
was repaid. In Rome, the creditor could have the debtor executed without
the burden of any judicial process whatsoever.'
Eventually, these methods were replaced, in both Athens and Rome,
with the more mundane practice of pledging property. 6 To prevent the
creditor from choosing at his pleasure from the debtor's available assets,
the debtor designated certain pieces of his property which would become
the property of the creditor if the debt was not paid. This practice
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. This comment does not extend to certain areas closely related to but not con-
templated under article 3158, such as the pledge of immovables, the Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Act, and the pledge of certain incorporeal rights created by operation
of law, such as trademarks.
2. H. Denis, A Treatise on the Law of the Contract of Pledge as Governed by
Both the Common Law and the Civil Law 2 (1898).
3. Id. See also Squillante, The Pledge as a Security Device, Part I, 87 Comm. L.
J. 618, 618 (1982).
4. Squillante, supra note 3, at 618.
5. Id. at 619.
6. The pledge of property is also found in ancient French law, and, in fact, the
word "pledge" comes from the old French law term pleige which meant a "surety" or
"personal security." The French pledge, however, was "real security," and the French
law writers distinguished between the concepts of surety and pledge by remarking that
.'Pieige plaide et gage rend.' The surety pleads or resists, but the pledge pays," Denis,
supra note 2, at 3.
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proved quite workable since it allowed the debtor to control which of
his properties would be subject to forfeiture while at the same time
providing an inducement for the creditor to make the loan.7
Under Roman law, the agreement took either of two forms: the
fiducia or the pignus. The fiducia contract, which developed first, trans-
ferred title to the creditor until the debt was paid. Upon payment in
full, the creditor was required to re-transfer title to the former debtor.
The pignus contract, like today's pledge, transferred only possession to
the creditor as security for the debt. Delivery of the property to the
creditor was the essential element of the contract. The debtor, however,
retained ownership, and the parties were free to agree that the debtor
would remain in possession of the property in some circumstances.
In the more recent history of pledge, personal property of various
kinds began to replace real estate as the more common object of pledge.
As a result of abuses by both debtors and creditors, relatively simple
rules of pledge were replaced, in civil law countries, with strict for-
malities. Gradually, during the nineteeth century, the rules were relaxed
once more in the interest of commerce, making a pledge valid simply
by delivery of the pledged property.8
Today, the formal requisites of pledge are not readily apparent. The
requirements differ depending upon the type of property being pledged,
which, under Louisiana law, may be either movable or immovable. 9 As
to movable property-by far the more common subject of pledge today-
the Louisiana Civil Code distinguishes between the formalities necessary
for pledging corporeal movables, incorporeal movables evidenced by a
written instrument, and incorporeal movables not evidenced by a written
instrument. Within these subdivisions, there are further distinctions, and
some objects of pledge do not clearly fit anywhere.10
Of great significance, in discerning the formal requisites of pledge,
is the Louisiana classification of pledge as a form of "real security.""
It functions primarily to give the creditor a right to have his debt
satisfied out of the property pledged and ahead of other creditors. 2
7. Squillante, supra note 3, at 619.
8. Denis, supra note 2, at 6-7.
9. "There are two kinds of pledge: The pawn. The antichresis." La. Civ. Code art.
3134. "A thing is said to be pawned when a movable thing is given as security; and the
antichresis, when the security given consists in immovables." La. Civ. Code art. 3135.
10. The law concerning pledge in Louisiana is found, generally, at La. Civ. Code
art. 3133 to 3381, and at La. R.S. 9:4321 to 9:4401.
11. Denis, supra note 2, at 1.
12. "The pawn invests the creditor with the right of causing his debt to be satisfied
by privilege and in preference to the other creditors of his debtor, out of the product




This privilege does not exist unless the pledge itself is valid, 3 and the
requirements for such validity differ depending upon whose rights are
at stake-the parties to the pledge or third persons asserting claims
against the pledged property. It thus becomes necessary to distinguish
those formalities necessary for the intrinsic validity of the pledge from
those necessary to make the pledge effective as to third persons. Un-
fortunately, this distinction is not always made clear, either by the code
or by the cases.
Because of the accessorial nature of pledge,14 its validity may also
have a significant impact on the primary obligation. Under Louisiana
Civil Code article 3464, "[pjrescription is interrupted when one ac-
knowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced
to prescribe."' 5 Louisiana courts have frequently asserted that a pledge
serves as such a constant acknowledgment and thus interrupts prescrip-
tion of the primary debt.' t6
A determination that a pledge is invalid can, therefore, result in
serious repercussions to the pledgee's position: he is left with no pref-
erence over other creditors as to the pledged property, and, perhaps
worse, the primary debt itself may have prescribed. Compliance with
the proper formalities of pledge therefore becomes crucial to the pledgee,
as well as the attorney advising him.
Unfortunately, the authority in this area offers little in the way of
clear guidance. Discerning which formalities are indeed necessary for
validity, both intrinsic and as to third persons, becomes a difficult,
often illusory goal. The purpose of this analysis is to sift through the
available authority and offer such guidance as exists on the formal
requisites of a pledge of movable property.
I. DELIVERY: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
"The symbol of the pledge, in the Roman law, is the fist of the
creditor closed on the pledge, denoting that actual possession which all
13. "The property of the debtor is the common pledge of his creditors, and the
proceeds of its sale must be distributed among them ratably, unless there exist among
the creditors some lawful causes of preference." La. Civ. Code art. 3183.
14. "Every lawful obligation may be enforced by the auxiliary obligation of pledge."
La. Civ. Code art. 3136.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 3464.
16. See Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956), for an extended
treatment of this subject and an abundant reference to authority in support thereof. Note,
however, that the opinion distinguishes between two views of this issue: (1) that the
existence of the pledge itself interrupts prescription, and (2) that it is not the contract
of pledge alone that interrupts, but rather the detention of the thing pledged (the view
espoused in Scott). In either case, a determination that the pledge was invalidly perfected
would seem to do serious harm to the argument of "constant acknowledgment."
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recognize as linked to the pledge, and without which none can exist.' 17
In Louisiana as well as in Rome, delivery-the actual dispossession of
the pledgor in favor of the pledgee-is the formality central to the
concept of pledge.' Civil Code article 3152 states that "[it is essential
to the contract of pledge that the creditor be put in possession of the
thing given to him in pledge, and consequently that actual delivery of
it be made to him, unless he has possession of it already by some other
right."' 9 Even as to the pledge of incorporeal rights-property not
susceptible to actual delivery-a "fictitious and symbolical" delivery is
required.20 A pledgor accomplishes such symbolical delivery by trans-
ferring to the creditor possession of the instrument evidencing the in-
corporeal. 2' Only pledges of incorporeal rights not evidenced by a writing
are released from the requirement of delivery. 22
As opposed to other security devices in which the creditor's rights
spring solely from an agreement with the debtor, a pledge cannot be
validly created by mere agreement. The pledgor must additionally dis-
possess himself of the property he is pledging in favor of the pledgee.
This actual delivery is required for two reasons: (1) to secure the rights
of the pledgee by placing the pledged property under his control, and
(2) to protect against fraud by the pledgor. 23 Addressing the concern
over fraud by the pledgor, the scholar Denis explains that,
[i]f the thing given in pledge remained in the hands of the
[pledgor] . . .he could pledge it to several persons at the same
time, deceiving them all.
In the emphatic language of Troplong: "By dispossessing him-
self, the debtor announces to third persons who deal with him
that he is impoverished by that much .... Where would business
be if things were pledged without delivery! what frauds! what
deceptions! what losses for third persons! "24
The Louisiana Supreme Court has been equally adamant, maintaining
that "[t]he privilege of pledge is subject to unbending conditions. There
17. Succession of Lanaux, 46 La. Ann. 1036, 1049, 15 So. 708, 711 (1894);
18. Lallande v. Ingram, 19 La. Ann. 364 (1867). It should be remembered, however,
that this discussion concerns only the "formalities" of pledge. Thus, a pledge for which
the proper formalities were present, but as to which there was no meeting of the minds
between the pledgor and pledgee, was not valid. Franklin v. Bridges Loan and Inv. Co.,
371 So. 2d 294, 296-97 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
19. La. Civ. Code art. 3152.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 3153.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 3162.
22. La. R.S. 9:4322 (1983).
23. Denis, supra note 2, at 79.
24. Id. at 79-80.
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must be an actual delivery, in order that those who transact with the
pledgor may know that the property is held in pledge .... The pos-
session of the pledgee should be real and effective at all times. It must
be apparent and well known." 25
It becomes critical, then, to understand what delivery entails-what
constitutes a dispossession by the pledgor of his property into the hands
of the pledgee such that a valid pledge is created. To begin with, the
pledge agreement and the dispossession of the pledgor do not have to
take place simultaneously. Although the pledge is not valid until the
pledgee has possession,
the law does not fix or specify the time when such possession
should begin. The pledgee may have had possession before the
contract of pledge was entered into and, in that case, the pos-
session continues; or the pledgee may only receive possession
some time after the contract and, in that case, the pledge is
vivified from the moment of possession. 26
In addition, the pledgor must dispossess himself of the property vol-
untarily. The direction of article 3152, that actual delivery be made to
the pledgee, does not lend itself to an interpretation that delivery may
be accomplished through the involuntary dispossession of the pledgor.
In Steadman v. Action Finance Corporation,27 Steadman had signed
with a finance company an agreement which evidenced an intent to
pledge two vehicles and which, in fact, declared that the vehicles had
been delivered to the pledgee on the date of the signing. The vehicles
had not been delivered, however, and had remained in Steadman's
possession. Upon Steadman's default, the finance company took pos-
session of the automobiles. In court, the company argued that the
"subsequent passive surrender" of possession by Steadman constituted
delivery and thereby perfected the pledge.28
The court, however, focused upon the fact that the written agreement
purported to be "a present pledge," since it contained a declaration
that the vehicles were delivered at the time the agreement was signed.
The court noted that no contention had been made that the agreement
was a "contract to pledge," contemplating delivery on a later date.
Therefore, according to the court, it was a "present pledge," and "since
there was no delivery pursuant to the written agreement there was no
pledge.' '29
25. Citizens' Bank v. Janin, 46 La. Ann. 995, 1001, 15 So. 471, 472 (1984).
26. Denis, supra note 2, at 121.
27. 197 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), writs refused, 199 So. 2d 918 (1967).
28. Id. at 427.
29. Id.
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The court was imprecise; there was no valid delivery at any point
because of the involuntary nature of the dispossession. A contention
that the agreement contemplated delivery at a later date should make
no difference. The court itself noted that the "circumstances surrounding
the 'taking of possession' by defendant's agents convinces us the taking
was unlawful and tortious." a0
Since article 3152 requires that the pledgee be put in possession of
the pledged property, the next step must be to determine what constitutes
valid possession by the pledgee. Article 3162 states that, as to movable
property, a pledge does not become valid until the pledged property
"has been actually put and remained in the possession of the creditor,
or of a third person agreed on by the parties."31 This provision allowing
possession by a third party has not proved to be very troublesome, so
long as there is a clear understanding by all the parties that the third
party is holding the property for the pledgee and that the pledgor himself
has been dispossessed of the property.
In Succession of Lanaux,32 the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
a third party arrangement lacked such a clear understanding. With the
knowledge of his creditors, the pledgor placed packages of promissory
notes to various creditors, along with the evidence of pledges securing
each, in his own bank box and instructed his clerk to deliver the packages
to his creditors. The court held that there was insufficient delivery,
asserting that,
[wihen the pledge is consummated by delivery to a third person
to hold for the creditor, it is the natural result that a liability
at once arises between the third person thus selected and the
creditor. No such liability, in this case existed ....
Placed in the debtor's bank box, deposited and held as his
property, the securities remained untouched until his death ....
There was clearly no delivery of the securities; none to the
creditor; none to a third person to hold for [the creditor] ....
The pledge was inchoate-a delivery proposed, but never ac-
complished. 33
Since the clerk never had possession of the securities as agent for the
pledgee, but instead held them for the pledgor, the pledgor had never
dispossessed himself of the property.
Succession of Bier34 involved a complicated third party arrangement
between a pledgor and three banks. Having already pledged certain
30. Id.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 3162 (emphasis added).
32. 46 La. Ann. 1036, 15 So. 708 (1894).
33. Id. at 1051-52, 15 So. at 712-13 (emphasis added).
34. 145 La. 722, 82 So. 868 (1919).
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mortgage notes to one bank, the pledgor pledged the same mortgage
notes to a second bank, subject to the rights of the first bank. This
second bank transmitted the pledge document to the first bank, who
took cognizance of the secondary pledge, retained a copy of the doc-
ument, and returned the original to the bank. Eventually the mortgage
notes were sold to a third bank who took the notes with the secondary
pledge attached. At trial, the third bank contended that the secondary
pledge was invalid, since the mortgage notes were never actually delivered
to the second bank, and that the pledge remained in the hands of the
first and, by then, the third bank. Since the pledgor was certainly
dispossessed of the mortgage notes, the issue was whether there was a
clear understanding by all parties as to the third party arrangement.
The court found that there was, noting that "[tihe understanding of all
parties evidently was that subsidiarily to its own pledge the Commercial
Bank was to hold the note subject to the pledge of the Citizens' Bank;
that when the Calcasieu Bank succeeded to the Commercial Bank as
holder of the pledged note, it did so on the same conditions." 35 The
court explained further that express terms were not necessary, thus, a
tacit agreement as to the third party arrangement was sufficient.
In Jacquet v. His Creditors,3 6 the third party arrangement was more
intriguing. There, the third party, who held a pledged piece of machinery
as agent for the pledgee, was an employee of the pledgor. As ticklish
as this arrangement might seem, the court apparently had no trouble
in finding a valid delivery, emphasizing that the third party exercised
control over the property, took care of it, cleaned it, and was paid for
these services. The court noted that the fact that the pledgor himself
was allowed to use the machinery did not derogate from the validity
of the pledge.3 7
Jacquet has been described as a "regrettable . . [situation] in which
the requirement of delivery is squeezed dry of any significance in order
to make the institution of pledge fit a given fact situation." 3 And,
according to Denis, Jacquet represents a clear "departure from the
principle so well established, that the possession of the pledgee must
not be uncertain or equivocal."3 9 It is certainly conceivable that, since
Louisiana had no chattel mortgage at the time of Jacquet, the court
felt induced to stretch the doctrine of pledge. 40 However, the principles
35. Id. at 726, 82 So. at 869.
36. 38 La. Ann. 863 (1886).
37. Id. at 866. As a basis for this reasoning, the court cited Conger v. City of New
Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 1250 (1880), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 45-47.
38. Dainow, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Security Devices, 18 La. L. Rev. 49,
50 (1957).
39. Denis, supra note 2, at 118.
40. Dainow, supra note 38, at 51.
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espoused in Jacquet are valid. Since the third party was possessing the
machinery for the pledgee and not the pledgor, the pledgor had been
validly dispossessed of the property. It is the appearance that the pledgor
is still in control of the property which evokes criticism.
The fact that the Louisiana Civil Code allows for possession of the
pledged property by a third party demonstrates that the possession by
the pledgee required under article 3152 is more specifically the "right
of possession" rather than the actual physical detention of the pledged
property. The courts in Lanaux, Bier, and Jacquet made their deter-
minations as to whether delivery to a third party created a valid pledge
by looking to see if the third party was obligated to the pledgee as his
agent. If the third party was so obligated, the pledgee thus had the
"right of possession" of the property even though he did not himself
physically possess it.
This premise, that the "right of possession" is determinative, has
led to an extension of the rule requiring actual possession by the pledgee,
or a third party obligated to the pledgee, to allow "the pledgeor [sic]
himself to be, to a certain extent, for a special purpose, the possessor
or detaiier ad hoe of the pledge for account of the pledgee."' Thus,
while the pledgoi must initially dispossess himself of the pledged property
in order to create a valid pledge, 42 a subsequent surrender of possession
by the pledgee does not necessarily extinguish the pledge. While retaining
his "right of bssession," the pledgee may surrender physical detention
of the property to the pledgor without invalidating the pledge. However,
such a surrender may raise a presumption, rebuttable by the pledgee,
that he has remitted the pledge.
Article 1889, in the obligations section of the Civil Code, states that
"[a]n obligee's voluntary surrender to the obligor of the instrument
evidencing the obligation gives rise to a presumption that the obligee
intended to remit the debt." ' 43 Article 1891 provides that "[rielease of
a real security given for performance of the obligation does not give
rise to a presumption of remission of debt."" Reading these rules
together, it may be implied that the return of the pledged property to
the pledgor results in a presumption that the pledgee has remitted the
pledge, although not the primary obligation thereby secured.
The initial burden of proof is thus borne by the pledgee, who must
establish that a valid pledge was created-that a valid agreement was
made between the pledgor and pledgee and that the pledge was perfected
41. Denis, supra note 2, at i14.
42. There is no authority in Louisiana for the proposition that the requirement of
an initial dipossession by the pledgor has been dispensed with.
.43. La. Civ. Code art. 1889.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 1891.
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by delivery. The burden then shifts to the pledgor to prove the extinction
of the pledge. His proof of a voluntary surrender of the thing pledged
by the pledgee gives rise to the presumption that the pledgee has remitted
the pledge. At that point, the burden of proof shifts back to the pledgee
to establish that there was not a remission, because the pledgor was
possessing the property as his agent.
Since the pledged stock had been sold and the primary obligation
had long since prescribed, the court's dicta in the century-old case of
Conger v. City of New Orleans,4 in support of possession by the pledgor,
has been uniformly cited by courts presented with similar issues. 46 The
oft-quoted passage begins with the general rule that delivery is essential
to pledge, but continues with this assertion:
Possession, though essential to the validity of the pledge, need
not be always in the creditor. It is sufficient that the thing
pledged be in the possession of one occupying, ad hoc, the
position of a trustee. The debtor himself may, in some cases,
be considered as such trustee and be given possession of the
thing by him pledged, provided his tenure be precarious and
clearly for account of the creditor. 47
In Citizens' Bank v. Janin, 48 the alleged pledgor, Janin, was in
possession of the pledged property. However, since he had never been
out of possession, the question was not so much whether Janin was
possessing it for the pledgee (although the parties had in fact agreed
to such an agency relationship), but whether there had ever been an
actual delivery of the property, and thus a valid pledge. Janin, the
owner of the steamboat in Louisiana, had executed a chattel mortgage
on the boat in New York, but had remained in possession of the boat
as agent for the pledgee under an agreement. Since chattel mortgages
were not recognized in Louisiana, the pledgee bank contended that the
transaction contained all of the elements of a valid pledge under Lou-
isiana law, specifically arguing that it had the required possession of
the boat under the Conger theory of ad hoc possession by the pledgor
for the pledgee.
The court held, 'however, that a valid pledge had not been created,
since there had not been an unequivocal dispossession by Janin in favor
of the bank.49 The court implied that in some instances the pledgor's
45. 32 La. Ann. 1250 (1880).
46. See, e.g., Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 377, 91 So. 2d 569, 572 (1956); Citizens'
Bank v. Janin, 46 La. Ann. 995, 1003, 15 So. 471, 473 (1894); and Muse v. Hill, 42
So. 2d 919 913 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
47. 32 La. Ann. at 1252.
48. 46 La. Ann. 995, 15 So. 471 (1894).
49. Id. at 1004, 15 So. at 473.
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use of the pledged property would not disturb the pledgee's possession.
Under the facts of Janin, however, the court did not have to respond
to that issue directly.
More recently, in Canal-Commercial Trust and Savings Bank v. New
Orleans T. and M. Ry. Co.,So the Louisiana Supreme Court determined
that a pledge of a bill of lading was not annulled, and that the creditor
did not lose his preference over the pledged property, when the pledgee
temporarily returned the bill of lading to the pledgor on a trust receipt.
Thus, the pledgee did not forfeit the pledge to other creditors; he took
only the risk that the pledgor would act in bad faith. 5
In Scott v. Corkern5 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court again determined
that possession by the pledgor did not destroy the pledge; however, the
opinion has been much criticized. In that case, a man had pledged a
life insurance policy to secure a loan in order to attend medical school.
At the time of the trial, both pledgor and pledgee had died; thus the
suit was between the relatives of each. The problem addressed by the
court was that, although the pledged policy had originally been placed
in the hands of a third party, it was found with the pledgor's belongings.
The pledgee's relatives claimed that the pledgor had possessed the policy
precariously as trustee for the pledgee. The court agreed, explaining that
it is manifest that the mere circumstance that the pledged in-
surance policy was found in the possession of the pledgor does
not justify the conclusion that the pledge was extinguished and,
in the absence of any evidence showing that the parties intended
that the pledge be terminated or even that the pledgor considered
it terminated, it will be presumed that the possession of the
pledgor was precarious or as an agent pro hac vice.53
Scott has been criticized as an indulgence by the court and a "move
in the wrong direction .... Although ... [the pledgor] did no act
inconsistent with the pledge agreement, there was nothing to show that
he could not have done so. There was nothing to characterize his tenure
as precarious; there was nothing to show conclusively that it was for
the account of the creditor." ' 54 It must also be noted that Scott involved
no third party creditors. Thus, it is arguable that the court looked more
50. 161 La. 1051, 109 So. 834 (1926).
51. Id. at 1065, 109 So. at 839. Thus, if the pledgor sells the pledged property. to
a good faith buyer, the pledgee loses the pledged property, but has a cause of action
against the pledgor.
52. 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
53. Id. at 378, 91 So. 2d at 572.
54. Dainow, supra note 38, at 50-51.
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to the intent of the parties and less to the formalities, so often relied
upon to protect innocent third parties."
In actuality, however, Scott does not represent a move in any
direction, but rather a honing in on, and a fine tuning of, certain aspects
of the general premise under analysis here. Since a presumption arises
that the pledge has been abandoned when the pledged property is found
in the possession of the pledgor, it becomes very significant in Scott
that the pledged life insurance policy had, at first, been delivered to a
third party agent, and that it was not clear how the policy came back
into the pledgor's possession or whether the pledgee had any knowledge
of the repossession by the pledgor. Such a scenario necessitates a dis-
tinction between a voluntary surrender of the property by the pledgee
into the pledgor's possession, which should more persuasively raise the
presumption that the pledgee has remitted the pledge, and an involuntary
loss of physical custody to the pledgor. 56 Scott involved what was ap-
parently an involuntary loss of physical custody; thus, the pledgee took
no action which evidenced a relinquishment of her claim and the pre-
sumption that the pledge is valid should remain intact. This is exactly
what the court in Scott did in presuming that the possession of the
pledgor was as an agent for the pledgee.
Though the court in Kreppein v. Demarest17 criticized the Scott
opinion to some degree, the two cases are quite compatible. In Kreppein,
the issue was whether a note which had been transferred from the
original pledgee to another pledgee had prescribed. The court's deter-
mination of the issue depended on whether there was in existence a
valid pledge, which would have interrupted prescription on the note.
The problem was that there was no evidence that anything had ever
been actually delivered to the original pledgee, much less to the current
holder of the note. Thus, the pledgee failed to carry his burden of
proof. Further, there was no agreement between the parties to the
litigation as to what property, in fact, had been pledged.
The court reasserted the view expressed in Conger v. City of New
Orleans 8 and Scott v. Corkern, 9 that the pledgor may possess precar-
55. Most troubling in Scott is footnote 2, in which the court asserted that the delivery
requirement, set forth in article 3162 as being necessary in order for the pledgee's privilege
to exist over other creditors, is not applicable as between the parties to the pledge. The
court did not mention article 3152, which states that delivery is "essential to the contract
of pledge," and the implication seems to be that delivery is not necessary between the
parties. At least two scholars have expressed disdain for this assertion, noting a lack of
direct authority for the view expressed in the footnote. Dainow, supra note 35, at 51;
Slovenko, Of Pledge, 33 Tulane L. Rev. 59, 74 (1958).
56. La. Civ. Code art. 3173 states: "The debtor who takes away the pledge without
the creditor's consent, commits a sort of theft."
57. 120 So. 2d 301 (La. App. Orl. 1960).
58. 32 La. Ann. 1250 (1880).
59. 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
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iously for the pledgee, but did not have to address that issue since there
was no initial delivery of pledged property to the pledgee. In finding
that there was not a valid pledge, the court expressed skepticism over
the fact that the pledgee knew so little about the pledged property,
noting that the pledgee
was not able to show exactly what . . . [the pledged property]
was nor whether it remained in the possession of the original
pledgee. He admitted that the pledged article had never been in
his actual possession and he could not show where it was, nor
in what capacity it was held, if in fact it continued to exist.
60
Thus, in all of these cases the initial and most important question
in determining whether a valid pledge has been created is whether the
pledgor has actually dispossessed himself of the property. It is only
then, when it has been established that there has been an actual dis-
possession of the pledged property in favor of the pledgee or third party
agent, that the analysis moves to the next issue-whether the pledgee
has maintained the possession. On this point, it must be remembered
that such possession should be thought of as a right or power to possess,
not physical detention.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 3158
While article 3152 sets out the basic delivery requirement for all
pledges, it is article 3158 which has developed into a notorious "junk
drawer" for accumulated legislative pronouncements as to the formal
requirements for the pledge of movables. 61 Since the remainder of this
60. Kreppein, 120 So. 2d at 306.
61. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 reads as follows:
But this privilege shall take place against third persons only in case the pledge
is proved by some written instrument, in which shall be stated the amount of
the debt intended to be secured thereby, and the species and nature of the thing
given in pledge; or the description of the thing pledged may be contained in a
list or statement annexed to the instrument of pledge and giving its number,
weight or descriptive marks.
When a debtor wishes to pledge promissory notes, bills of exchange, bills of
lading, stocks, bonds, policies of life insurance, or written obligations of any
kind, he shall deliver to the creditor the notes, bills of exchange, bills of lading,
stocks, bonds, policies of life insurance, or other written obligations, so pledged,
and such pledge so made, except as hereinafter provided with regard to life
insurance policies, shall without further formalities be valid as well against third
persons as against the pledger thereof, if made in good faith, provided that
where the pledge of instruments not negotiable, the debtor must be notified
thereof, it being understood that no notification is required in the case of the
pledge of certificates of corporation stock. All pledges may be made by private
writing of any kind if only the intention to pledge be shown in writing, but
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comment will attempt to untangle the many rules crowded into article
3158, a brief history of its development should provide a useful backdrop
for the analysis to follow.
First enacted in 1804 in the Code Napoleon, the provision elaborated
on the pledgee's privilege over other creditors, described in the article
directly preceding it, and prescribed the formalities necessary for the
creation of such a privilege as follows:
This privilege takes place only in case there is a public act or
an act under private signature, duly registered, mentioning the
amount of the debt, as well as the species and nature of the
all pledges, except of a life insurance policy in favor of the insurer, must be
accompanied by actual delivery. The pledge of a life insurance policy must also
be evidenced by a written assignment thereof as security to the pledgee and by
delivery of the pledge. or assignment to the insurer and, unless the beneficiary
thereof may be changed upon the sole request of the insured, or unless pledge
or assignment without the consent of the beneficiary be specifically provided
for in the policy, must be accompanied by the consent of any named beneficiary
who is not the insured or his estate; it is further provided that whenever a
pledge of any instrument or item of the kind listed in this article is made to
secure a particular loan or debt, or to secure advances to be made up to a
certain amount, and, if so desired or provided, to secure any other obligations
or liabilities of the pledger or the pledgee, then existing or thereafter arising,
up to the limit of the pledge, and the pledged instrument or item remains and
has remained in the hands of the pledgee, the instrument or item may remain
in pledge to the pledgee or, without withdrawal from the hands of the pledgee,
the instrument or item may remain in pledge to the pledgee or, without with-
drawal from the hands of the pledgee, be repledged to the pledgee to secure
at any time any renewal or renewals of the original loan or any part thereof
or any new or additional loans, even though the original loan has been reduced
or paid, up to the total limit which it was agreed should be secured by the
pledge, and, if so desired or provided, to secure any other obligations or liabilities
of the pledger to the pledgee, then existing or thereafter arising, up to the limit
of the pledge, without any added notification or other formality, and the pledge
shall be valid as well against third persons as against the pledger thereof, it
made in good faith; and such renewals, additional loans and advances or other
obligations or liabilities shall be secured by the collateral to the same extent as
if they came into existence when the instrument or item was originally pledged
and the pledge was made to secure them; the delivery of property on deposit
in a warehouse, cotton press, or on storage with a third person, or represented
by a bill of lading, shall pass to the pledgee by the mere delivery of the
warehouse receipt, cotton press receipt, bill of lading, or storage receipt, showing
the number, quantity or weight of the thing pledged; and such pledge so made,
without further formalities, shall be valid as well against third persons as against
the pledger thereof, if made in good faith. Such receipts shall be valid and
binding in the order of time in which they are issued for the number, quantity,
or weight of the things pledged, if there should not be enough to meet all
receipts so issued. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal any
part of Title 9, Sections 4301 to 4382, both inclusive of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950.
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thing given in pledge, or having a statement annexed thereto of
its quality, weight and measure. 62
Comparing this language to the current article 3158, it is obvious that
this early provision is the direct antecedent of what is now paragraph
one.
The wording of this original provision remained basically unchanged
until 1900, when it was amended to contain its present language. 61
Additional provisions were added in 1952 and subsequently. Instead of
the previous requirement of a public act or a private act plus registration,
the amended language, now paragraph one of article 3158, requires only
"some written instrument." Just as before, this written instrument must
include the amount of the debt and a description of the property being
pledged.
The remainder of article 3158 originated separately from what is
now the first paragraph. In Act No. 25 of 1852, forty-eight years after
the antecedent provision to the first paragraph had been enacted, the
legislature set out formal requirements for the pledge of various incor-
poreals-"promissory notes, bills of exchange, stocks, [and] obligations
or claims upon other persons"-stating that a pledge of these incor-
poreals is made valid against the pledgor and against third parties simply
by delivery to the pledgee of the "notes, bills of exchange, certificates
of stock, or other evidences of the claims or rights." 64 The Act also
provides that if the property pledged is non-negotiable, the debtor must
be given notice, and that delivery to a pledgee of a warehouse receipt
creates a valid pledge "as well against third persons as against the
pledgors thereof .... "165
Two provisions in the Act do not expressly limit their applicability
to the pledge of incorporeals. One of these provisions is set out as sec-
tion 4 of the Act and authorizes the non-judicial sale of the pledged pro-
perty upon agreement by the parties. This section is the only section of
the Act not included as part of article 3158.
The other provision not expressly limited to incorporeals deals with
formalities of pledge and is found in section 2 of the Act. It provides
that "all pledges of moveable property may be made by private writing,
accompanied by actual delivery .. "66 The rest of section 2 deals with
the pledge of incorporeals. Because of its position in the Act, in the
midst of provisions regarding incorporeals, and because it was placed
in paragraph two of article 3158, still in the midst of provisions expressly
62. Code Napoleon 1804, art. 2074, par.l.
63. 1900 La. Acts No. 157.





applicable to incorporeals, there is a sound basis for arguing that this
provision was intended to apply solely to the pledge of incorporeals.
Act No. 287 of 1855 enacted virtually identical language to that of
the 1852 Act, but added a section which repealed "all laws contrary to
the provisions of this Act, and all laws upon the same subject-matter,
except what is contained in the Civil Code and Code of Practice".67
Just what the legislature intended to accomplish with this provision is
not readily apparent. In Act No. 138 of 1866, the same provisions were
again enacted, but this time with a different repealing section, proclaim-
ing, "[tihat all laws and parts of laws contrary to or conflicting with
the provisions of this Act, be and the same are hereby repealed." ' 6
Quite arguably, the provision which developed into what is now the
first paragraph of article 3158, was itself in conflict with the provisions
of the 1866 Act. In requiring formalities in addition to delivery, in order
that the pledgee's privilege over other creditors be valid, it contradicted
section 1, which provided that delivery of the instrument evidencing an
incorporeal claim is the only formality required, both as to intrinsic
validity and validity against third parties.
Legislative enactments and revisions of article 3158 subsequent to
the 1866 Act have not contained a similar repealing provision. 69 The
failure to include the repealing provision does not, however, negate the
provision of 1866 and thereby erase its effect. Any law which was
repealed as contradictory in 1866 should therefore remain repealed unless
reenacted specifically to undo the work of the repealing provision.
Since 1866, the first paragraph of article 3158 has been reenacted
twice, in 1900 and 1952.70 Neither amendment, however, contained any
specific instruction that the article should be applied to the pledge of
incorporeals as well as corporeals. Under the argument that it was
contradictory to the 1866 Act and thereby repealed, insofar as its appli-
cability to the pledge of incorporeals, the additional formalities required
by the first paragraph of article 3158 should not be applicable to the
pledge of incorporeals.
Finally, in 1952, Act No. 290 added specific formal requirements
regarding the pledge of life insurance policies, corporation stock, and
property on deposit in a warehouse, cotton press, or in storage with a
third person, plus an additional provision dealing with the repledge of
instruments.
From the history of article 3158, it is apparent that the two par-
agraphs of the current article originated and developed separately, in
67. 1855 La. Acts No. 287 (emphasis added).
68. 1866 La. Acts No. 138 (emphasis added).
69. Article 3158 was subsequently reenacted by 1900 La. Acts No. 157 and by 1952
La. Acts No. 290.
70. Id.
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spite of the fact that they are situated together in one article. This
mutually exclusive development, together with the fact that the 1866
Act repealed conflicting laws, provides persuasive support for arguing
that the two paragraphs of article 3158 are in fact two separate sets of
rules; paragraph one addresses the pledge of corporeals, and paragraph
two concerns solely the pledge of incorporeals.
III. THE FORMAL REQUISITES FOR PLEDGE OF CORPOREAL MOVABLES
The formal requisites necessary for a valid pledge of a corporeal
movable are set forth quite clearly in two Civil Code articles. Article
3152 sets forth the requirement of delivery, the minimal requirement,
while paragraph 1 of article 3158 provides further that the pledgee's
"privilege shall take place against third persons only in case the pledge
is proved by some written instrument .... ,,7' The written instrument
must include: (1) the amount of the debt to be secured, and (2) a
description of the property being pledged, although it is likewise ac-
ceptable for the description to "be contained in a list or statement
annexed to the instrument of pledge and giving its number, weight or
descriptive marks. '72 Under these two provisions, it seems quite evident
that only delivery is required for intrinsic validity; an oral pledge of
corporeals is sufficient. For validity against third parties, however, there
must be delivery plus a written agreement evidencing the agreement.
A possible source of confusion lies within the second paragraph of
article 3158 which instructs that "all pledges may be made by private
writing of any kind if only the intention to pledge be shown in writing,
but all pledges ... must be accompanied by actual delivery." ' 73 In light
of this provision, the earlier conclusion that an oral pledge plus delivery
is sufficient for intrinsic validity is cast in some doubt. As discussed in
the previous section, however, arguably none of the provisions in the
second paragraph of article 3158 are intended to apply to the pledge
of corporeals. In any event, the instruction is only that pledges may be
made by private writing, not that they must be. In fact, the cases on
the subject of the pledge of corporeals espouse the earlier conclusion,
that delivery alone is sufficient for intrinsic validity, while delivery plus
a written agreement is necessary only for validity against third parties.
In Sambola v. Fandison,74 the court reviewed the plight of the
peddler, Sambola, who persuaded a New Orleans merchant named Fan-
71. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 1. As discussed in the previous section, the
requirement of a mere "written instrument" reflects a relaxing of the formaliites required,
since, before 1900, this provision required either a public act or an act under private
signature plus registration.
72. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 1.
73. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 2.
74. 178 So. 276 (La. App. Orl. 1938).
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dison to turn over to him brooms and mops on the condition that he
would pay back to the merchant any proceeds from the sales, keeping
only the profit for himself. Instead, he returned to Fandison empty-
handed, contending that he had been robbed in Lake Charles. Not to
be outdone, Fandison claimed that Sambola had pledged a truck to him
as security for the lost inventory.
In the ensuing litigation, Sambola argued that there was no valid
pledge, since there was (1) no written instrument evidencing the pledge,
(2) no definite amount of debt secured by the pledge, and (3) no delivery
of the truck to Fandison. The court responded that the requirements
of a written instrument and a definite amount of debt secured by the
pledge were not applicable in this case, since no third parties were
challenging the validity of the pledge. The court explained that the
"portion of Civ. Code Art. 3158, in which reference is made to the
requirement of proof 'by some written instrument' . . . shows clearly
that proof by written instrument is necessary only where it is intended
that the pledge 'shall take place against third persons."'" Since the
requirement that there be a definite amount of debt secured comes from
article 3158, the court concluded that the requirement applies only to
validity against third parties. 76 The court did agree that delivery of the
truck was essential to the validity of the pledge, even between the parties,
but found that there had been such a delivery, since Sambola's truck
had been left with Sambola's brother-in-law, from whom Fandison was
to, and in fact did, obtain it.
Another case, Madding v. Hoover,77 involved the pledge of two
diamond earrings as security for a gambling debt. In particular, the
court confronted the problem of determining who are "third persons"
under the first paragraph of article 3158. An ex-wife of the pledgor,
the former owner of the earrings, argued that the pledge was not valid
against her, since she was a third party to the pledge transaction and
the pledge was not in writing. The court described how the ex-wife had
written for her former husband letters which discussed the whole pledge
transaction, and how she had participated in events surrounding the
pledge. The opinion concluded that her "conduct and actions ... were
such as to identify her as a participant in the transaction and remove
her from the category of a 'third person' as contemplated by the above
75. Id. at 278. This position has been reaffirmed in State v. Ackal, 290 So. 2d 882
(La. 1974); Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Consolidated Terminal Warehouse, Inc., 460
So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); and Davis v. Davis, 50 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1951).
76. 178 So. at 278-79.
77. 44 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
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article [3148]. ' '78 By ratifying the pledge, she became a party to the
agreement. 79
In dicta, the court also provided some insight into what the re-
quirement of a written instrument entails. Explaining that article 3158
does not require a formal written act of pledge, but merely a written
instrument stating the amount of the debt and a description of the
property pledged, the court noted that there was in fact a written
instrument.80 According to the court, the letters written by the ex-wife
were sufficient.
IV. THE FoRMAL REQUISISTES FOR PLEDGE OF INCORPOREAL MOVABLES
In stark contrast to the straightforward and uniform requirements
for the pledge of corporeal movables, the formal requirements for pledge
of incorporeal movables become discernible only after much shifting and
sorting of rules, scattered like puzzle pieces in nooks and crannies of
the Civil Code and jurisprudence.
A starting point exists, however, in that the Civil Code and its
ancillaries approach the requirements for pledge of incorporeal movables
by treating separately those incorporeal movables which are evidenced
by a written instrument from those which are not.
A. Incorporeal Movables Evidenced by a Written Instrument
The second paragraph of article 3158 sets forth certain formalities
required for the pledges of incorporeal movables evidenced by a written
instrument:
When a debtor wishes to pledge promissory notes, bills of ex-
change, bills of lading, stocks, bonds, policies of life insurance, or
written obligations of any kind, he shall deliver to the creditor the
notes, bills of exchange, bills of lading, stocks, bonds, policies of
life insurance, or other written obligations, so pledged, and such
pledge so made, . . . shall without further formalities be valid
as well against third persons as against the pledger thereof, if
made in good faith, provided that where the pledge of instru-
ments not negotiable, the debtor must be notified thereof ....
78. Id. at 188.
79. "One person may pledge the property of another, provided it be with the express
or tacit consent of the owner." La. Civ. Code art. 3145. "But this tacit consent must
be inferred from circumstances, so strong as to have [leave] no doubt of the owner's
intention; as if he was present at the making of the contract, or if he himself delivered
to the creditor the thing pawned." La. Civ. Code art. 3146 (brackets in original).
80. 44 So. 2d at 188.
81. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 2 (emphasis added).
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This passage reflects the diffentiation in article 3158, of the requirements
for pledge of incorporeals evidenced by a written instrument, into those
necessary for pledging a negotiable, as opposed to a non-negotiable,
instrument. After establishing this basic division, the article makes some
exceptions for the pledge of life insurance policies and corporate stock
and offers further elaboration on the pledge of bills of lading and
warehouse receipts. A discussion of the requirements for pledging in-
corporeals evidenced by a written instrument thus necessarily requires a
further subdivision of the topic, into the categories of (1) negotiable
instruments, (2) non-negotiable instruments, and (3) special situations.
There are, however, three issues concerning the pledge of an in-
corporeal evidenced by a written instrument which require analysis re-
gardless of which category the pledged instrument falls into, and thus
should be addressed at the outset. The first issue is whether the first
paragraph of article 3158, which requires a written instrument stating
the amount of the debt and a description of the pledged property in
order for the pledge to be valid against third parties, is applicable to
the pledge of incorporeals evidenced by a written instrument. The second
paragraph of the article states that upon delivery of the instrument, the
pledge is "valid as well against third persons as against the pledger
thereof .... ,,s2 Additional requirements are prescribed for non-nego-
tiable instruments and life insurance policies, but there is no express
incorporation of the requirements set out in the first paragraph. It has
been argued, however, that the first paragraph of article 3158 is ap-
plicable to pledges of incorporeals evidenced by a writing.
In Wallace v. Fidelity National Bank, 3 the trial court espoused the
position that the first paragraph is applicable to such pledges. It de-
termined that the pledge of a promissory note was invalid as to third
parties, and thus would not prime other creditors, since the delivery of
the note was not accomplished by a written pledge instrument. The first
circuit disagreed, asserting that a fair reading of the article leads to the
conclusion that
the first paragraph establishes the general rule that a contract
of pledge of movable property, in order to affect third persons,
must be by written act containing certain required information.
The second paragraph of the Article makes exceptions to this
general rule, .... whereby only delivery of excepted object is
required to perfect a pledge valid against the world.14
82. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 2.
83. 219 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 253 La. 1083, 221 So. 2d 517
(1969).
84. Id. at 344.
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In Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Consolidated Terminal Ware-
house, Inc.," however, the same court took the other position. The
issue was the validity of a pledge of invoices, and the parties were in
disagreement over how to label such property-as incorporeals evidenced
by a written instrument or as incorporeals not evidenced by a written
instrument. The court asserted that, regardless of which label was ap-
plied, the pledge was invalid as to third parties unless there was written
evidence of the pledge, stating the amount of the debt and the nature
of the thing pledged, under article 3158.86 Thus, there is no clear
jurisprudential guidance as to whether the requirement of a written
instrument in paragraph one is applicable to the types of pledges spe-
cifically addressed in paragraph two.
The earlier discussion on the development of article 3158 becomes
relevant here as a strong basis for deciding the issue in favor of non-
applicability of the first paragraph. Generally overlooked by the courts
are two helpful observations derived from a study of the article's history:
(1) the two paragraphs were enacted separately and developed separately;
and (2) since paragraph one was contradictory to Act No. 138 of 1866,
which prescribed rules for pledging incorporeals evidenced by a written
instrument, the Act's repealing provision quite arguably had the effect
of making paragraph one inapplicable to the pledge of incorporeals
evidenced by a written instrument. The result flowing from these ob-
servations is that paragraphs one and two of article 3158 have distinct
applications-the first deals with corporeals, the second with incorporeals
evidenced by a written instrument.
The second issue regards the meaning of the provision in the second
paragraph of article 3158 that "[a]ll pledges may be made by private
writing of any kind if only the intention of pledge be shown in writing,
but all pledges, . . . must be accompanied by actual delivery." '87 Due
to its position in the second paragraph, it seems clear that the provision
applies to the pledge of an incorporeal evidenced by a written instrument.
What is not so clear is whether this provision implies that a written
instrument evidencing the parties' intent to pledge-as distinguished from
the written instrument evidencing the pledged incorporeal which is de-
livered to the pledgee-is mandatory for the intrinsic validity of such
pledges, in spite of the use of the word "may" in the provisions.
While the provision is ambiguous, the argument can be made that
the provision is completely superfluous unless it implies a requirement
of an additional written instrument evidencing the pledge. An implication
that a private writing is merely optional only restates, and at the same
85. 460 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 669.
87. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 2.
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time confuses, the earlier statement in paragraph two that delivery of
the instrument evidencing the incorporeal is the sole requirement.
A stronger argument may be made for the position that the provision
suggests only an optional formality for the pledge of an incorporeal
evidenced by a writing. As was pointed out earlier, paragraph two of
article 3158 includes another provision, preceding the one at issue,
which states that delivery of the written instrument is the only require-
ment (plus notice to the debtor in the case of non-negotiable instruments),
and that the pledge "shall without further formalities be valid." 8 These
two provisions were enacted as sections 1 and 2 in Act No. 25 of 1852.89
Since a mandatory requirement of a written instrument evidencing the
intent to pledge contradicts the preceding statement that delivery is the
sole requirement, the reasonable interpretation seems to be that the
provision expresses a merely optional formality.
The language and phrasing of the provision itself lends support to
this interpretation. The first part of the provision says that there may
be a private writing, while the last part says that the pledge must be
accompanied by actual delivery. The resulting implication is that actual
delivery is the key element; a written instrument may be used to evidence
the agreement so long as it shows the parties' intent to pledge, but the
writing itself does not create a valid pledge.
The jurisprudence reflects clear support of this latter view, that a
written instrument is not mandatory for the intrinsic validity of a pledge
of an incorporeal evidenced by a written instrument, although the courts
generally only cite article 3158 for this conclusion without offering any
further reasoning.
In American Bank and Trust Co. v. Straughan,90 for example, the
court asserted:
It is clear that when a debtor wishes to pledge written obligations
of any kind to secure an indebtedness, the debtor perfects the
pledge by delivery to the creditor of the obligations pledged to
secure the indebtedness, and such pledge so made is valid and
binding without further formality, Louisiana Civil Code Article
3158; it is not necessary to the efficacy of a contract of pledge
that it be in writing .... 91
88. Id.
89. 1852 La. Acts No. 25.
90. 248 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), writ denied, 259 La. 746, 252 So. 2d
450 (1971).
91. Id. at 77. See also, Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Consolidated Terminal
Warehouse, 460 So. 2d 663, 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Plumbing Supply House, Inc.
v. Century Nat'l Bank, 440 So. 2d 173, 176 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), writs denied, 444
So. 2d 1226 (La. 1984); Mardis v. Hollander, 426 So. 2d 392, 395 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writs denied, 430 So. 2d 93 (La. 1983); and Acadiana Bank v. Foreman, 343 So. 2d
1138, 1141 (La. App. 3d Cir.), aff'd, 352 So. 2d 674 (La. 1977).
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The third issue springs from the language contained in a Civil Code
article that is closely related to article 3158. Article 3156 states that
"[wihen a debtor wishes to pawn a claim on another person, he must
make a transfer of it in the act of pledge, and deliver to the creditor
to whom it is transferred the note or instrument which proves its
existence." ' 92 It seems arguable that the emphasized language implies that
a written act of pledge is required; the jurisprudence, however, does
not indicate that the courts have contemplated such an argument.
The opposing argument would again be that the implication of such
a requirement is contradictory to the clear language of article 3158 which
states that delivery is the sole requirement for the pledge of negotiable
instruments. Also, since article 3156 contained the emphasized language
in 1866, when Act No. 138 repealed the articles in conflict with its
provisions (which included the provision that delivery is the sole re-
quirement), the contention that a written act of pledge is required under
article 3156 is greatly weakened.
These three issues-the applicability of paragraph one of article 3158
to the pledge of an incorporeal evidenced by a written instrument, the
interpretation of the provision in the second paragraph of article 3158
regarding a private writing, and the implication from article 3156 that
a written act of pledge is necessary when pledging an obligation-lurk
as potential "flies in the ointment" when addressing the formal re-
quirements for the pledge of an incorporeal evidenced by a written
instrument. With this warning, the analysis may now move to a dis-
cussion of the specific requirements prescribed by the second paragraph
of article 3158 and related articles for the pledge of negotiable instru-
ments, non-negotiable instruments, and other special cases.
1. Negotiable Instruments
Under article 3158, a pledge of an incorporeal evidenced by a written
instrument is validly created by the delivery of the instrument to the
pledgee, "and such pledge so made ... shall without further formalities
be valid as well against third persons, as against the pledger thereof
... provided that where the pledge of instruments not negotiable, the
debtor must be notified thereof . . . -91 Thus, after subtracting the
additional requirement for non-negotiable instruments, it seems apparent
from the language of this provision that one may validly pledge ne-
gotiable instruments simply by delivering the instruments to the pledgee.
Such delivery creates not only the instrinsic validity of the pledge but
its validity against third persons as well.
92. La. Civ. Code art. 3156 (emphasis added).
93. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 (emphasis added).
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The jurisprudence concerning the pledge of negotiable instruments
supports this conclusion. In Plumbing Supply House, Inc. v. Century
National Bank,94 only the intrinsic validity of the pledge was at issue,
since no third parties were involved. The case involved the alleged pledge
of a home by way of a ne varietur collateral mortgage bearer note.
The Girards, who owned the home and were the alleged pledgors of it,
contended that the pledge was invalid since Mr. Girard had not signed
the hand note which explicitly pledged their house as security.
The court concluded that the absence of Mr. Girard's signature was
not determinative, asserting that
[als to the collateral pledge agreement we note that while this
document may be evidence of an intent to pledge it is not
necessary to perfect a pledge of the type involved in this case.
The pledge here was of a ne varietur collateral mortgage note
in bearer form. To pledge such a negotiable instrument no
written agreement or other formality beyond delivery to the
pledge is required. 9
The court noted further that, while an intent to pledge must be shown
in order that the pledge be complete, such intent does not have to be
evidenced in a writing; it can be inferred from the circumstances.
In Wallace v. Fidelity National Bank,96 the issue was the validity
of the pledge as to other creditors. As discussed earlier, the pledge of
a promissory note had not been accompanied by a written pledge in-
strument and the contention addressed by the court was that this lack
of a written instrument destroyed the effectiveness of the pledge as to
third persons. The court disagreed with this contention, asserting that
delivery is the only formality required to perfect a pledge of a negotiable
instrument .97
Civil Code article 3156, already discussed for its implication that a
written act of pledge is required for the pledge of an incorporeal evi-
denced by a writing, provides further insight into the pledge of negotiable
instruments by way of its history. At one time, article 3156 contained
additional words at the end: ". . . and must indorse it if it be nego-
tiable." These words were excluded, however, when the article was
amended in 1981. 98 As a result of this amendment, it now seems quite
94. 440 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), writs denied, 444 So. 2d 1226 (La.
1984).
95. Id. at 176. See also, Mardis, 426 So. 2d at 395; American Bank and Trust Co.
v. Straughan, 248 So. 2d 73, 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); and Foreman, 343 So. 2d at
1141.
96. 219 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 253 La. 1083, 221 So. 2d 517
(1969).
97. Id. at 344.
98. La. Civ. Code art. 3156 was amended by § I of 1981 La. Acts No. 315.
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apparent that articles 3158 and 3156 require no endorsement, even for
"order" paper, to perfect a valid pledge. Delivery is the sole requirement.
One writer advises that "as a practical matter, a pledgee should
insist upon such an endorsement so that he will have the right to enforce
the pledge if it becomes due prior to the underlying obligation or if
there is a default in the underlying obligation." 99 In fact, a pledgee has
a statutory right to force the pledgor to endorse the pledge under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-201(3) 100 This route could necessitate a
lawsuit, however, if the pledgor refuses to comply, a step which can
be avoided by requiring an endorsement from the outset.
2. Non-Negotiable Instruments
With the pledge of non-negotiable instruments, attention must be
directed not only to the requirements necessary for intrinsic validity and
validity as to third persons, but also to those requirements necessary
for validity as to the obligor on the pledged instrument. To lessen
confusion as much as possible, the discussion of the required formalities
will address each area separately.
a. Intrinsic Validity
Article 3158, paragraph 2, requires more than just delivery for the
pledge of non-negotiable instruments; it adds: "provided that where the
pledge of instruments not negotiable, the debtor must be notified thereof
.... -101 Article 3160 is also relevant: "When the thing given in pledge
consists of a credit or instrument not negotiable, the pledge shall be
complete as to all the world, as soon as the debtor of such pledged
credit or instrument shall have been notified in writing of the giving of
such pledge."' 10 2 Although both of these articles require notice to the
debtor on the pledged instrument, article 3158 seems to imply that such
notice is necessary for the intrinsic validity of the pledge, while article
3160 seems to imply that such notice is necessary only for validity
against people who are not parties to the pledge. Another difference is
that article 3160 requires that a written notification be given to the
debtor, whereas article 3158 states only that the debtor must be notified,
with no requirement that the notification be in writing. The first step,
99. Rubin, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Security Devices, 42 La. L. Rev.
413, 416 (1982).
100. La. R.S. 10:3-201(3) reads as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed a transfer for value of an instrument not then payable
to bearer gives the transferee the specifically enforceable right to have the
unqualified endorsement of the transferor. Negotiation takes effect only when
the endorsement is made and until that time there is no presumption that the
transferee is the owner.
101. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 2.
102. La. Civ. Code art. 3160.
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therefore, is to determine which, if any, of the requirements in these
articles is necessary for the intrinsic validity of the pledge. Unfortunately,
the jurisprudence provides scant guidance.
In Foote v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada,103 the court con-
fronted the issue of whether a pledge of a life insurance policy was
intrinsically valid, despite the fact that the insurer on the policy had
not been notified of the pledge's existence. At the time this case was
decided, life insurance policies were not named specifically in article
3158, as they are today; thus, they fell under the general category of
non-negotiable written obligations.
The court looked only to article 3160 for guidance and concluded
that the notice to the debtor on the instrument, required by that article,
is without application to the immediate parties to the agreement
and may only be invoked by a third person. The obvious purpose
of its enactment was to prevent the debtor of the security pledged
from paying his obligation to the pledgor or to anyone else,
other than the pledgee, where he has written notice of the
pledge. °4
Since the court did not look to article 3158, the holding in Foote is
severely limited. The court's reasoning, that the notice requirement in
article 3160 is inapplicable to intrinsic validity, could be used just as
readily, however, to find the article 3158 notice requirement unnecessary
to intrinsic validity.
In fact, in the more recent case of Louisiana National Bank of
Baton Rouge v. O'Brien,05 the first circuit asserted that Foote implicitly
recognized that the article 3158 requirement of notice, like the article
3160 requirement, applied only to third party creditors of the pledgor. 106
The assertion was dicta, however, and the fact remains that Foote did
not address article 3158; guidance from other courts on these issues has
not been forthcoming. The question of whether notice to the debtor is
required for the intrinsic validity of the pledge thus remains largely
unanswered. The question of whether such notice, if required, must be
written has not been addressed in an opinion where intrinsic validity is
the issue. The only certain requirement for intrinsic validity is that of
delivery.
103. 173 So. 477 (La. App. Orl. 1937).
104. Id. at 481.
105. 439 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 443 So. 2d 590 (La. 1983).
106. Id. at 555, citing Williams v. Succession of Anderson, 133 La. 640, 641, 63 So.
250, 251 (1913).
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b. Validity as to Third Persons
Possibly because of the clear language in article 3160 that "the
pledge shall be complete as to all the world, '1 0 7 as soon as the debtor
on the instrument has been notified of the pledge, the law appears well
settled that the pledge of a non-negotiable instrument will not be en-
forceable against third parties unless such notice has been given.
In Commercial Bank of Alexandria v. Shanks,10 s a judgment creditor
challenged the validity of an alleged pledge of a certificate of indebt-
edness issued by the City of Alexandria in favor of the judgment debtor.
According to Mr. Shanks' testimony, he had assigned the certificate to
the bank for collection; the certificate, however, had disappeared from
the bank's portfolio. It was found in the possession of the father-in-
law, Mr. Crockett, who claimed that the certificate had been pledged
to him.
Sorting out the confusion, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined
that there had not been a valid pledge of the certificate by Mr. Shanks
to the cashier since "[t]he evidence shows no delivery to Mr. Crockett
personally, and it is not pretended that any written notice of a pledge
of the certificate was given to the City of Alexandria.' °9 Citing articles
3158 and 3160, the court explained that "[a] pledge of a non-negotiable
instrument, not only requires delivery, but written notice thereof to the
debtor of the credit."' 10
In Williams v. Succession of Robertson (In re Maumus),"' the
Louisiana Supreme Court continued to espouse its position in Shanks
that a pledge of a non-negotiable instrument is not enforceable against
third parties unless notice has been given to the debtor on the instrument.
In this case there was a pledge of stock certificates, but the debtor on
the certificates had not been notified about the pledge." 2 Since the
person challenging the validity of the pledge was the administrator of
the alleged pledgor's succession, the issue was whether the pledge could
be enforced against him, as a representative of the creditors of the
succession. The court unhesitatingly determined that since no notice had
been given to the debtor on the certificates, the pledge was without
effect. "3
Though the court in Maumus made no mention of whether the
notice must be written, it appears clear from Shanks and Maumus that
107. La. Civ. Code art. 3160.
108. 129 La. 861, 56 So. 1028 (1911).
109. Id. at 864, 56 So. at 1029.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. 133 La. 640, 63 So. 250 (1913).
112. When this case was decided in 1913, the special language now present in article
3158, which excepts corporate stock from the notice requirement, was not contained in
the article.
113. Mamus, 133 La. at 643, 63 So. at 251.
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a pledge of a non-negotiable instrument is not valid against third parties
unless the debtor on the instrument has received notice of the pledge,
and, under Shanks, that the notice was written. Of course, the instrument
* also must be delivered to the pledgee.
c. Validity as to the Debtor on the Pledged Instrument
The final question is whether there must be notice to the debtor
on the pledged non-negotiable instrument for the pledge to be enforceable
against that debtor, and whether the notice must be in writing.
In Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge v. O'Brien"4 the first cir-
cuit determined that notice to the debtor on the instrument is not necessary
for the pledge of a non-negotiable instrument to be valid against that
debtor. In that case, a non-negotiable $280,000 note, executed by O'Brien
in favor of a partnership and transferred by the partnership to LeBlanc,
had been pledged to Louisiana National Bank (LNB) by LeBlanc. When
LeBlanc was placed in bankruptcy, LNB served notice on O'Brien to
pay the note. This notice came three and one-half years after the note
had been pledged to LNB and was the first notice received by O'Brien
that the note had been pledged. O'Brien refused to pay it.
In the litigation that followed, the trial court asserted that, since
the note was not negotiable, written notice of the pledge had to be
given to O'Brien within a reasonable time. Since notice was received
after three and one-half years, the trial court concluded that LNB had
no right of action against O'Brien.
The first circuit reversed, stating that the debtor on the pledged
security is not in the same position as a third party creditor. The court
explained that
[t]he debtor on the security pledged certainly stands in place of
-. the pledgor. He has no more rights than the pledgor with
reference to the pledge itself. Since La. C.C. Arts. 3158 and
3160 cannot be invoked by the pledgor to invalidate the pledge,
they cannot be invoked by the debtor on the security for the
same purpose." 5
A little over a year later, however, the first circuit took a different
position. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Consolidated Terminal Ware-
house, Inc. '" 6 involved the pledge of invoices to secure loans made by
Citizens Bank to Consolidated. The debtor on the invoices was Scaf-
folding Rental and Erection Service. When Citizens Bank sued Scaf-
folding to collect the debts represented by the invoices, Scaffolding
contended that the invoices had not been validly pledged since Scaf-
114. 439 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writs denied, 443 So. 2d 590 (1983).
115. Id. at 555.
116. 460 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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folding, as the debtor on the invoices, had not received written notice
of the pledge. The court agreed that the debtor on a pledged non-
negotiable instrument must receive written notice of the pledge under
articles 3158 and 3160. The court concluded, however, that such notice
had been given since copies of the invoices, on which there was printed
language stating that they were being pledged, had been mailed to
Scaffolding by the pledgor."17
In summarizing the requirements for pledging non-negotiable in-
struments, it is not clear whether the debtor on the pledged instrument
must receive notice in order for the pledge to be valid as to him. The
more recent pronouncement on the subject is that such notice is necessary
and that the notice must be in writing. As to third parties, however,
the law appears to be well settled that the pledge is not valid unless
written notice is given to the debtor on the pledged instrument. As to
intrinsic validity, the law is also not clear. According to Foote v. Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Canada,"8 notice of the debtor on the pledged
instrument may not be necessary for intrinsic validity. Finally, for in-
trinsic validity, validity against third persons, and validity against the
debtor on the pledged instruments, there must be actual delivery of the
non-negotiable instrument.
3. Special Cases
a. Life Insurance Policies
The formal requirements for the pledge of a life insurance policy
receive detailed treatment in article 3158, but apparently very little
treatment in the jurisprudence.' 9 Before 1952, article 3158 made no
mention of life insurance policies, but language added in 1952120 sets
forth specific guidelines for-the pledge of such property.
Article 3158, paragraph two, includes life insurance in the listing
of incorporeals evidenced by a writing. It states that delivery of the
written instrument evidencing the incorporeal is the only formality nec-
essary for a valid pledge, "except as hereinafter provided with regard
to life insurance policies."' 21 The additional guidelines for the pledge
of a life insurance policy prescribe that
all pledges, except of a life insurance policy in favor of the
insurer, must be accompanied by actual delivery. The pledge of
117. Id. at 669-70.'
118. 173 So. 477 (La. App. Orl. 1937).
119. Foote v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada involved the pledge of a life insurance
policy but was decided long before article 3158 was amended to add the special provisions
concerning such policies. Scott v. Corkern also concerned the pledge of life insurance,
but the discussion of formalities was limited to delivery and possession.
120. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 was amended by 1952 Acts No. 290.
121. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 para. 2.
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a life insurance policy must also be evidenced by a written
assignment thereof as security to the pledgee and by delivery of
the pledge or assignment to the insurer and, unless the beneficiary
thereof may be changed upon the sole request of the insured,
or unless pledge or assignment without the consent of the ben-
eficiary be specifically provided for in the policy, must be ac-
companied by the consent of any named beneficiary who is not
the insured or his estate.'
The following requirements may be derived from this passage. First,
the pledgor must deliver the policy to the pledgee, unless the pledgee
is the insurer on the policy. Second, there must be a "written assign-
ment" of the policy to the pledgee, evidencing the pledge. The words
''written assignment" must actually mean a written pledge agreement,
however, since assignment and pledge are two very different concepts.
The use of the word "assignment" in describing a requirement of pledge
is a contradiction of terms. Third, the pledgor must deliver the written
pledge agreement to the insurer. Finally, any beneficiary who is not the
insured or his estate must give his consent, unless under the policy the
beneficiary can be changed upon request by the insured or the policy
provides for pledge without the beneficiary's consent. The article does
not make any distinction as to requirements necessary for intrinsic
validity as opposed to validity against third parties or validity as to the
insurer on the policy. Until there is jurisprudence which interprets these
provisions, the safe approach is to comply with each of the requirements.
b. Corporate Stock
The pledge of a corporation's stock also receives special treatment
in article 3158. Although notice of the debtor is required for the pledge
of non-negotiable instruments, article 3158 states that it is "understood
that no notification is required in the case of the pledge of certificates
of corporation stock."' 23 It appears that delivery of the stock to the
pledgee is the only formality required for validity between the parties,
as to third persons, and as to the issuer of the stock. Here again the
jurisprudence offers little assistance.
Even such a simple requirement may cause problems. In Lallande
v. Ingram, 24 the would-be pledgor attempted to pledge shares of stock.
He had paid for a subscription agreement and had directed the cor-
poration to send the stock certificates to the pledgee. The shares of
stock, however, had not been issued. The court determined that the
pledge was invalid, explaining that "[s]hares in stock cannot be pledged,
unless they be evidenced by certificates, which must be transferred and
122. La. Civ. Code art. 3158.
123. Id.
124. 19 La. Ann. 364 (1867).
1987]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
delivered to the pledgee.' ' 21 Since no certificate had been issued, none
had been transferred, and there was no pledge.
Though the requirements for the pledge of stock are simple, a
creditor who grants a loan secured by the pledge of stock may want
to take extra precautions as a practical matter. One writer has suggested
that "it is always advisable to have a document setting forth the true
intent of the parties so there will be no dispute at a later date as to
the type of security device created. 1' 26 The creditor may also want to
include a provision which allows him to vote the stock, in order to
protect his interest, or a provision allowing him to sell the stock at a
private sale upon default, to avoid first having to obtain a judgment.1 27
c. Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, etc.
Paragraph two of article 3158 states that
the delivery of property on deposit in a warehouse, cotton press,
or on storage with a third person, or represented by a bill of
lading, shall pass to the pledgee by the mere delivery of the
warehouse receipt, cotton press receipt, bill of lading, or storage
receipt, showing the number, quantity or weight of the thing
pledged; and such pledge so made, without further formalities,
shall be valid as well against third persons as against the pledger
thereof, if made in good faith . *...128
The only formal requirement, at least under Article 3158, for the pledge
of warehouse receipts, bills of lading, and similar instruments, is the
delivery of the receipt containing a description of items pledged. Such
delivery should make the pledge valid both intrinsically and as to third
parties.
Here, again, even so simple a requirement can be difficult. In In
re Pine Grove Canning Co., 129 the court held the pledge of a warehouse
receipt invalid against other creditors because of problems with the
management of the warehouse owned by the pledgor. The court ac-
knowledged that under article 3158 delivery of the receipt is sufficient,
but asserted that the warehouseman's lack of control over the warehouse
and failure to comply with applicable law caused the receipt itself to
be invalid. 30
125. Id. at 368.
126. Rubin, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Security Devices, 42 La. L. Rev.
413, 416 (1982).
127. Rubin, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Security Devices, 41 La. L. Rev.
389, 398 (1981).
128. La. Civ. Code art. 3158 (emphasis added).
129. 226 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd sub. nom, Whitney Nat'l Bank of New
Orleans v. Sandoz, 362 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1966).
130. Id. at 877-88.
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In Blanc v. Germania National Bank, 3' the plaintiff representing
the pledgor challenged the validity of a pledge of warehouse receipts
by contending that the act of pledge of warehouse receipts did not
contain an adequate description. The court responded that under article
3158 mere delivery of the receipts was required; each such receipt should
contain an ample description of the property. 3 2
In stating the requirements for the pledge of warehouse receipts,
bills of lading, and similar instruments, article 3158 does not require
endorsement of the instrument. The article also does not distinguish
between instruments that are negotiable and those that are not. Under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:7-504, "[a] transferee of a document,
whether negotiable or non-negotiable, to whom the document has been
delivered but not duly negotiated, acquires the title and rights which
his transferor had or had actual authority to convey."'3 Delivery as
required by article 3158 should thus effectively place the pledgee into
the pledgor's shoes without further formality.
Reliance solely on the article 3158 requirement of delivery, however,
can place the pledgee in a vulnerable position. If the instrument is not
negotiable and no notice has been given to the warehouseman or carrier,
the warehouseman or carrier may unwittingly surrender the goods to
the pledgor.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:7-403, the warehouseman or
carrier has an obligation to deliver the goods to "a person entitled
under the document"'' 34 unless he can establish a lawful excuse. Section
4 of the statute defines "person entitled under the document" as "the
person to whom delivery is to be made by the terms of or pursuant to
written instructions under a non-negotiable document."'." According to
section 7-404 of the statute, if the warehouseman in good faith has
"received goods and delivered or otherwise disposed of them according
to the terms of the document of title,' ' 36 he will not be liable for
delivering the goods to a person who had no authority to receive them.
While delivery alone thus creates a valid pledge, notification of the
warehouseman or carrier of the pledge becomes a practical necessity.
B. Incorporeal Movables Not Evidenced by a Writing
The formal requisites for pledging incorporeal movables not evi-
denced by a writing were enacted by Act No. 95 of 1938. Until that
131. 114 La. 739, 38 So. 537 (1905).
132. Id. at 743, 38 So. at 538.
133. La. R.S. 10:7-504 (1983).
134. La. R.S. 10:7-403 (1983).
135. La. R.S. 10:7-403(4) (1983).
136. La. R.S. 10:7-404 (1983).
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time, such incorporeals were not considered susceptible of pledge because
of a very basic problem: there was nothing, not even a document
symbolizing the incorporeal, which could be delivered to and be possessed
by the pledgee.
The case of Caffin v. Kirwan'17 illustrates the problem. The would-
be pledgor attempted to pledge his rights under a lease on a "bathing
establishment." The parties had executed a notarial agreement evidencing
the pledge and had recorded it in the conveyance records. The contention
was made that this agreement was equivalent to a fictitious or symbolic
delivery. The court disagreed with that contention, holding that there
was no valid pledge since there had been no delivery, either actual or
symbolic. Instead, they viewed the agreement and recording as "amount-
ing to nothing." M
The court took the same position in Sevin and Gourdain v. Cail-
louet 3 9 In that case, there was an attempt to pledge a mortgage and
vendor's privilege on property. Again, the parties had executed and
recorded an agreement evidencing the pledge. Citing Caffin, the court
concluded that "[t]here was certainly no delivery of possession,"' 4 and
thus there was no valid pledge.
In dicta, the Caffin court offered its opinion on how such rights
might validly be pledged. It stated that "a legal delivery might have
been effected by an instrument in the form of a sale or transfer, of
all Kirwan's right to Caffin for the avowed purpose of securing him
by way of pledge, accompanied by a notice to Kirwan's lessor. This
would have vested the legal title into the pledge. 1 41 According to this
suggestion, an additional agreement in the form of a sale or transfer
would create a valid pledge "when it appears that the intention of the
parties was to secure an existing debt and not the transfer of the property
outright. 1' 42 While there are apparently no cases in which a valid pledge
of an incorporeal, not evidenced by a written instrument, was created
by this method, the courts have determined that such an agreement in
the form of a sale may effect a valid pledge of immovable property. 4
The scholar Denis points out inherent problems in the use of a sale
to effect a pledge of incorporeals not evidenced by a written instrument,
137. 7 La. Ann. 221 (1852).
138. Id.
139. 30 La. Ann. 528 (1878).
140. Id. at 532.
141. 7 La. Ann. at 221.
142. Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938, 1 La. L. Rev. 80, 109
(1938).




in that third parties are not sufficiently placed on notice. He explains
that
[a] sale may be made of credits which have no muniments of
title, because the delivery and possession to the purchaser are
not an essential element of that contract, as they are of that
of [sic] pledge. But, if the pledge in the form of a sale, in
order to be valid as to third persons, must fulfil all the re-
quirements of the contract of pledge, it is clear that the ostensible
vendee, in reality the disguised pledgee, must be put in possession
of the thing pledged under the garb of a sale, and that his
possession must be ostensible, notorious and such as to warn
third persons. When the thing pledged is a credit without mu-
niment of title, it is evident that the pledge of it in the form
of a sale can have no effect as regards third persons.' 44
This confusion, over whether or not incorporeals not evidenced by
a written instrument could be pledged due to the impossibility of delivery,
led to the passing of Act No. 95 of 1938. l41 According to two scholars,
"[tihe main effect of the 1938 Act ... [was] to eliminate the requirement
of delivery for the pledge of such incorporeal rights as are not evidenced
by written instrument or muniment of title.' 1 46 The last two of the
three sections of the Act, codified as Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4321
through 4323, have caused little dispute. Section 4322 states that "[tihe
pledge shall be valid as to all persons without delivery of the claim,
credit, obligation, or incorporeal right to the pledgee.' ' 47 Section 4323
further provides that, "[tlo bind the obligor to pay the amount due to
the pledgee, notice of the pledge shall be given in writing to the obligor
or shall be acknowledged in writing by him.' 1 48 These instructions are
quite clear: there is no requirement of delivery; to bind the obligor on
the pledged incorporeal, he must be given notice or must himself ac-
knowledge the pledge in writing.
It is the first of the three statutes, with its ambiguous language,
that has caused confusion in this area. Section 4321 states that "[c]laims,
credits, obligations, and incorporeal rights in general not evidenced by
written instrument or muniment of title, shall be subject to pledge, and
may be pledged in the same manner as other property.' ' 49 Specifically,
the last ten words are the cause of the problem.
144. Denis, supra note 2, at 137-38.
145. The provisions of 1938 La. Acts No. 95 are found in La. R.S. 9:4321-4323
(1983).
146. Hebert and Lazarus, supra note 142, at 109.
147. La. R.S. 9:4322 (1983).
148. La. R.S. 9:4323 (1983).
149. La. R.S. 9:4321 (1983).
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It has been argued that the term "other property" should be under-
stood to refer to corporeal movables; incorporeals not evidenced by a
writing should be pledged in the same manner as corporeal movables.150
The court in Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Consolidated Terminal
Warehouse, Inc."' took this position when confronted with the pledge
of invoices which were arguably incorporeal rights not evidenced by a
written instrument. The court reasoned that "other property" in section
4321 "must refer to the pledge of corporeal movables because there
exists no written instrument susceptible of delivery, as in the pledge of
an incorporeal right evidenced by a written instrument."' 5 2 To be valid
between the parties, an oral pledge is thus sufficient; a written pledge
is not required. For validity as to third parties, article 3158 requires
that there be some written evidence of the pledge, stating the amount
of the debt and a description of the thing pledged.'"
The court in Vaughn Flying Service v. Costanza" 4 took a different
approach. There the court had to determine what requirements were
necessary to make a pledge of a bank account effective against other
creditors. Looking to the history of section 4321, the court concluded
that the pledge of the bank account was effective against third parties
without a written instrument stating the amount of the debt secured.
The court reasoned that the phrase "may be pledged in the same
manner as other property"' 55 in section 4321 was
not ... a directive to incorporate other statutory rules, but
merely . . . a declaration that, contrary to the prior jurisprud-
ence, incorporeal rights not evidenced by written title can indeed
be pledged and that this can be done 'in the same manner,'
i.e. without the necessity of an additional act of transfer, as
other property . . . . The sole purpose of the phrase is to
accentuate the break from the prior jurisprudential rule that
some agreement in addition to the pledge is required. 5 6
The court was apparently referring to the use of a sale to effectuate a
pledge, as suggested in Caffin. In dicta, the court further explained that
the parties could sign a written act of pledge if they wished, but that
the pledge would be valid without such an act if the obligor as to the
pledged incorporeal had been given written notice or had given a written
acknowledgment. 157
150. Hebert and Lazarus, supra note 142, at 109-10.
151. 460 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 668.
153. Id. at 668-69.
154. 590 F. Supp. 1077 (W.D. La. 1984).
155. La. R.S. 9:4321 (1983).
156. 590 F. Supp. at 1080-81.
157. Id. at 1081.
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The reasoning in Vaughn Flying Service is defective, however, in
that it overlooks the basic problem in pledging incorporeals which are
not evidenced by a written instrument-the fact that there is nothing
which can be delivered to the pledgee and thus no ostensible possession
by the pledgee to put a third person on notice that the right has been
pledged. While the Act of 1938 does remove the delivery requirement
for the pledge of these incorporeals, the need to warn third persons
remains. For this reason, the better approach seems to be the one taken
in Consolidated Terminal Warehouse.'" The article 3158 requirement,
that of a written instrument evidencing the debt and describing the rights
pledged in order for the pledge to be enforceable against third parties,
should be applicable to pledges of incorporeals not evidenced by a written
instrument.
In fact, despite a holding to the contrary, the federal district court
offered similar advice in dicta in its opinion in Vaughn Flying Service.
The court advised that the signing of a written act "would of course
be the wisest procedure to follow until the issue is definitively resolved
by the Louisiana Supreme Court or by a clarifying legislative enactment.
The opinion of a federal district court acting as a surrogate civilian
court gives scant security to a pledgee-creditor seeking to protect his
claim against third parties."13 9  /
The court in Vaughn apparently considered notification of the obligor
a requirement necessary not only to bind the obligor but also to make
the pledge valid against third parties. Compliance with this formality
may also be the "safe" approach, since under article 3160 "the pledge
shall be complete as to all the world"'160 as soon as the debtor has been
notified. As to validity between the parties themselves, an oral pledge
is sufficient under Consolidated Terminal Warehouse. Even for intrinsic
validity, however, the "safe" approach may be to have a written in-
strument evidencing the pledge, since the pledgee otherwise has nothing
in his possession by which he can prove the pledge.
C. Incorporeals Which May Be Pledged by More Than One Method
1. Bank Deposits
The formalities required for pledging bank deposits depend upon
the nature of the deposit. If it is a bank account, not evidenced by a
writing other than periodic statements, the formalities for pledging an
158. 460 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
159. Vaughn Flying Service, 590 F. Supp. at 1081 n.5.
160. La. Civ. Code art. 3160.
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incorporeal not evidenced by a written instrument apply. As already
discussed, the court in Vaughn Flying Service1 61 concluded that an oral
pledge of bank accounts was enforceable against third parties. However,
a more defensible approach was taken in Montaldo Insurance Agency,
Inc. v. Culotta,162 where the court determined that there was sufficient
written evidence to constitute a valid pledge, enforceable against third
parties. For validity between the parties themselves, an oral pledge is
adequate under Redman Energy, Inc. v. Peoples State Bank.163
Also significant in Montaldo was the court's response to the con-
tention that there was no actual delivery of the bank account to the
depository bank. The court responded that since the bank already had
possession of the deposits there was no need for an actual delivery. An
argument not raised in the case is that, under Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:4322, there is no requirement of delivery in the first place with regard
to incorporeals not evidenced by a written instrument. If the bank deposit
is evidenced by a certificate of deposit, the provisions in article 3158
and related articles apply for the pledge of an incorporeal evidenced by
a written instrument. Thus, if the certificate is negotiable, delivery is
required; if it is non-negotiable, both delivery and notice to the dep-
ository bank are necessary.
In Peoples Bank and Trust Co., Natchitoches v. Harper,6 there
was an attempt to pledge to Peoples Bank a non-negotiable certificate
of deposit issued by a savings and loan association. A written agreement
evidencing the pledge was sent to the savings and loan association, who
acknowledged it and recorded the pledge in their records. Subsequently,
the would-be pledgor, who had retained the certificate, withdrew most
of the funds from the deposit. Upon maturity and default on the loan
secured by this pledge, Peoples Bank instituted the lawsuit, claiming
that the savings and loan association had violated a valid security interest.
The court determined that the pledge was not valid, however, since
there had been no delivery of the certificate to the bank.
First National Bank of Commerce v. Hibernia National Bank in
New Orleans65 also involved the pledge of a non-negotiable certificate
of deposit. In that case, Hibernia had issued a certificate of deposit to
Mr. and Mrs. Callico and then loaned them money. The Callicos executed
a pledge agreement in favor of Hibernia which stated that the loan was
secured by every balance in their accounts. Later, the Callicos pledged
161. 590 F. Supp. 1077. See supra text accompanying notes 154-59.
162. 153 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
163. 497 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
164. 370 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), writ denied, 371 So. 2d 1330 (La.
1979).
165. 427 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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the certificate of deposit, issued by Hibernia, to First National Bank.
Again there was a written pledge agreement, signed by the Callicos and
sent to Hibernia, who signed in acknowledgment. The Callicos delivered
the certificate to First National. When the loan they had made to the
Callicos matured, First National Bank presented the certificate to Hib-
ernia and requested payment. Hibernia refused, claiming that it was
setting off the principal and interest accrued on the certificate in sat-
isfaction of the Callicos' debts to Hibernia.
During litigation, Hibernia contended that its right of pledge covering
the certificate was superior to First National's claim. Noting that under
Montaldo the pledge of a bank account was held to be valid without
delivery since the bank was already in possession of the funds, Hibernia
argued that First National's possession of the certificate did not defeat
Hibernia's claim. The court disagreed, stating that "[t]his logic should
not apply to a situation where a certificate of deposit is involved ....
For a pledge of funds represented by a certificate of deposit to be valid,
possession of the certificate is essential."' 66
An interesting aspect of the pledge of bank deposits is the fact that
the pledgor may withdraw funds from the pledged accounts. The court
in Montaldo explained that
Ithe fact that ... the bank permitted withdrawals from defend-
ant's saving and checking accounts, which withdrawals reduced
the total amount of the pledged deposits, did not result in a
surrender of the pledge or pledges. The creditor is free to reduce
the amount of the security if he sees fit and does not thereby
invalidate the pledge; there remains a valid pledge of that portion
of the security which is retained by the creditor.' 67
Similarly, Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:316,168 which was added by
Act No. 451 of 1986 and which by operation of law sets up the pledge
to the depository bank of funds deposited in a bank, also allows with-
drawals by the pledgor/depositor. Under that statute, "compensation
takes place by operation of law between funds held on deposit with a
bank . . .and any loan, extension of credit, or other obligation incurred
by the depositor in favor of the bank."' 6 9 By operation of law, the
funds on deposit are considered to be pledged by the depositor to the
bank, and "[t]he ability of the depositor to withdraw funds from a
deposit account at will shall not be deemed to adversely affect the
validity of the pledge provided under this Section.' 170 The bank must
166. Id. at 572.
167. 153 So. 2d at 901.
168. La. R.S. 6:316 (Supp. 1987).
169. La. R.S. 6:316(A) (Supp. 1987).
170, La. R.S. 6:316(B) (Supp. 1987).
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notify the depositor in writing within two business days from the time
compensation takes place.
Unanswered at this point is the question of whether a pledge of an
account with notice to the depository bank is equivalent to a withdrawal
by the pledgor. If not, it seems that now, in order to pledge a bank
account to a pledgee other than the depository bank, it is necessary to
get a release of the pledged account from the depository bank in favor
of the pledgee.
2. Rents
There are at least four ways by which rent accruing from the lease
of immovable property may be pledged. In the cases of Hamilton Co.
v. Hughes7 ' and Triagle v. AMI, Inc.,' 172 it was determined that rents
from immovables do not fall in the class of immovables, but rather are
incorporeal movables. 173 One may thus effectively pledge rents by com-
plying with the formalities for pledging incorporeals not evidenced by
a written instrument under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4321 through
4323. To be valid against third parties and to bind the lessee, a written
pledge should be executed and written notice sent to the lessee.
A second method for pledging rents is authorized by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:4401,' 74 which requires that a written act of pledge
be filed in the conveyance records of the parish where the immovable
is situated, in order for the pledge to have effect against third parties.
It does not become binding on the lessee until he is given written notice
by the pledgee.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:830'71 authorizes a third method in
which rents may be pledged-as a mortgage provision in favor of a
savings and loan association. According to the statute, a mortgage
securing a loan on immovable property "may provide for an assignment
of rents, and if such assignment is made, any such assignment shall
become absolute upon the mortgagor's default, becoming operative upon
written demand by the association.' 1 76 The mortgage has priority over
all subsequent claims if it is recorded within three working days after
its execution.
The second and third methods for pledging rents are illustrated in
the cases of Toomer v. Lowenthal 77 and Mexic Brothers, Inc. v. 108
171. 141 So. 398 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
172. 280 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 282 So. 2d 719 (La. 1973).
173. Hamilton, 141 So. at 400; Triangle, 280 So. 2d at 860.
174. La. R.S. 9:4401 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
175. La. R.S. 6:830 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
176. La. R.S. 6:830(A) (1986).
177. 430 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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University Place Partnership.178 In Toomer, the purchasers of certain
property were challenging an alleged pledge, by the previous owners
to a savings and loan association, of rents accruing from the lease of
the property. The pledge was evidenced by a written instrument which
had .been recorded in the mortgage records of the parish. No written
notice of the pledge had been given by the pledgee to the lessees. Looking
to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4401, the court concluded that the pledge
was not enforceable against the purchasers of the property, as third
parties, since the instrument had not been recorded in the conveyance
records as the statute instructs. Moreover, since no notice was given to
the lessees, the court also determined that the pledge was not valid
against the purchasers under article 3160.179
The fourth circuit stated that they disagreed with Toomer and de-
clined to follow it in Mexic Brothers. As in Toomer, the issue was
whether a pledge of rents to a savings and loan association, as additional
security for an indebtedness already secured by a mortgage, was en-
forceable against third parties when it had been recorded in the mortgage
records, rather than the conveyance records. The court concluded that,
while Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4401 requires recordation in the con-
veyance records, Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:830 provides for recor-
dation in the mortgage records, and thus the pledge was valid. Noting
that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4401 states that the statute is intended
to provide an additional method for pledging rents, the court asserted
that if the court in Toomer had been cited to Louisiana Revised Statutes
6:830, "it would have reached the opposite result."' 80
Finally, the Louisiana Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act, 8 '
authorizes a fourth way to pledge rents from immovable property. Under
the Act, "accounts receivable" or "account" includes "indebtedness
owing to the assignor in connection with ... the leasing of movable
or immovable property."' 182 A pledge is effected by filing the notice of
assignment in the conveyance records of the parish where the immovable
property is located.' 83 Once the notice is filed, "the assignment shall be
valid as to third parties and, as to them, shall constitute a completed
assignment, sale, or pledge, or any combination thereof, of the accounts
receivable covered, notwithstanding the fact that any debtors of the
account are not notified of or do not consent to the assignment."'184
178. 488 So. 2d 1193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
179. 430 So. 2d at 356-57.
180. 488 So. 2d at 1195-96.
181. La. R.S. 9:3101 to 3111 (Supp. 1987).
182. La. R.S. 9:3101 (Supp. 1987).
183. La. R.S. 9:3101(C) (Supp. 1987).
184. La. R.S. 9:3102(B) (Supp. 1987).
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CONCLUSION
The law governing the formalities of pledge has evolved into a
chaotic hodge-podge of disconnected requirements. A confector of pledges
must proceed cautiously and cunningly, at least until the time that the
legislature gets around to a spring cleaning of the messy accumulation
of rules heaped principally in article 3158.
Valerie Seal Meiners
